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TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF PREEMPTION
George H. Quester
The world could this year be celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary ofwhat came to be known as “Copenhagening.” In August 1807, a British fleet
for the second time confronted the Danish government at Copenhagen with an
ultimatum that the possibility of the Danish fleet falling under the control of
Napoleon could not be tolerated. Just as before the 1801 attack under the com-
mand of Admiral Horatio Nelson, the Danes were given the choice of surrender-
ing their fleet to British control or of doing battle. The Danes resisted in 1807 as
in 1801, with the result that the bulk of their fleet was destroyed (along with per-
haps 30 percent of the city of Copenhagen itself), but the important result for
Britain was that Napoleon was once more precluded from mustering a naval
threat.1
The British rocket-firing and mortar ships that were used in the attack on Co-
penhagen were to see action again in the 1814 British attack on Baltimore during
the War of 1812, in “the rocket’s red glare, the bombs bursting in air.” (One won-
ders whether anyone between 2007 and 2014 will now be exploring a special
“sister city” celebration between Copenhagen and Baltimore.)
The threat headed off by British preemption is all too analogous, of course, to
the threat posed since September 2001 by the possibility of mass-destruction
terrorism against the U.S. homeland. Since such terrorists cannot be deterred by
the prospect of retaliation, and since defenses against such attacks will always be
imperfect, the lives of millions of Americans will be at stake. Whatever the wis-
dom or folly of the particular American “preemptive” attack on Iraq, future
American presidents will have to be willing to consider striking first to preempt
an attack on American cities.
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The Bush administration has been criticized for blurring the distinction be-
tween “preemption” and preventive war. There are many ways to draw this dis-
tinction, but our intuition may often fall back upon the question of whether war
is imminent and inevitable (whereupon we might be less morally critical of the
initiative taken and label it “preemption”) or whether peace might instead have
been an option for longer (with a morally condemnable “preventive war” initi-
ated simply because the power relationships were being changed). In defense of
any leader making such choices, however, it must be noted that “worst-case anal-
ysis” may often make an adversary’s attack seem inevitable, once the conditions
for such an attack are right, so that actions to head off the attack will always seem
like “preemption.”
As our model from the past, the threat the Royal Navy preempted at Copen-
hagen was existential, a threat to the very safety of Britain itself. If Napoleon or
anyone else had ever been able to assemble naval superiority in the English
Channel, the independence and liberties of Englishmen would have been at an
end. The memories of the two preemptive attacks on Denmark were to be en-
shrined for a century thereafter in
periodic references, in Britain and
among Britain’s prospective ad-
versaries, to the option of another
“Copenhagening” attack, striking
first against any challenger to
British naval supremacy. Such threats were fairly openly voiced in Britain in the
first decade of the twentieth century, by First Sea Lord Sir John (“Jackie”) Fisher
and many others, against imperial Germany, after the kaiser elected to build a
fleet rivaling Britain’s.2
Before London’s attention shifted to Germany, the same prospects and threats
were discussed almost as openly against France, always a threat and rival in Brit-
ish eyes.3 Around the time of disputes with Washington about the British Guiana–
Venezuela border and about Central America, such threats were also voiced
vis-à-vis the United States (at a time when Britain had some forty battleships
and the United States had three but was planning to build more).4 One can in-
deed find earlier references in congressional debates on naval expansion, where
opponents of such expansion voiced fear that it would merely lead to a British
“Copenhagening” attack on the United States.5
If the British threat was intended to keep imperial Germany or later the
United States from expanding their fleets, it did not succeed in the end. Yet the
threat of such preemption or preventive war was never seen as an entirely idle
threat by prospective adversary states. Nelson and his successors had, after all,
1 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
“Preemption” and “anticipatory self-defense”
came to draw moral disapproval as a result of
World War I.
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proved that Britain was willing to act first militarily where its very existence was
threatened.
As a real illustration of the same kind of reasoning in one British confronta-
tion with the United States we must note the British attack on the Niagara River
in 1837 against the Caroline.6 The attacked vessel was quite rightly suspected of
being utilized to help the Canadian rebels against British authority in southern
Ontario. Rather than waiting for another shipload of weapons to come across
the river to aid the rebels, a British naval raiding party preemptively sailed over
to the American side, seized the ship, in the process killing a number of people,
and then sent the burning vessel crashing over Niagara Falls.
The American protests over this mini-repetition of the Copenhagen experi-
ence included an 1841 note from Secretary of State Daniel Webster that has be-
come remembered as the “Caroline doctrine.” Perhaps the most significant U.S.
citation in today’s international law, the doctrine seeks to place stringent limits
on what any power can inflict as a preemptive act, stressing that the attack being
preempted must be very imminent and that the preemptive action has to be pro-
portional to the attack being headed off.7 It is more than a little ironic that this
doctrine, the major American contribution to international law, is now regularly
being challenged and minimized by American legal scholars associated with the
Bush administration.8
If one wants another illustration of the logic of “Copenhagening,” one can
move forward to the decisions made by Winston Churchill in 1940 immediately
after the Germans had reached Paris and won a French surrender. Churchill, of
course, knew what “Copenhagening” meant, having been a close associate of
Jackie Fisher in the years of the German-British naval race before World War I.
Rather than live with the risk that the French fleet might fall under Hitler’s con-
trol, Churchill dispatched British ships to several French ports in North Africa
with an ultimatum very similar to what had been given to the Danes, except that
the French were given three choices, rather than merely two. They could put their
naval vessels under British control; or they could sail their ships across the At-
lantic and station them in Martinique and Guadeloupe, in effect under Ameri-
can surveillance; or they could do battle with the British. The French chose to do
battle, with the result that several French warships were sunk and some 1,300
French naval personnel lost their lives.9
Churchill chose not to label this engagement with the French with the phrase
“Copenhagening,” for this might hardly have endeared him to the Danes, who
had just been subjected to the Nazi occupation, or to the Americans, or to the
few other neutrals left in the world. Most Americans were indeed relieved by the
British attack, as a sign that Britain under Churchill was not prepared to come to
terms with Hitler’s Nazi Germany but would fight on.
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But the imminence of preemptive motives as World War II evolved is hardly
limited to the British naval tradition. One important theme of this article will be
that preemption may indeed have been somewhat legitimatized by all the expe-
riences of 1939 to 1941 in other places, as the unfolding of the new war substan-
tially eroded the worldview that liberals around the world had endorsed in 1918.
The dominant theme of world opinion in 1918, as embodied in Woodrow
Wilson’s designs for the League of Nations, was that “anticipatory self-defense”
was a major part of the problem for international relations, causing wars to oc-
cur that perhaps neither side had wanted. The rule for the new League of Na-
tions was to be that of “collective security,” by which whoever was the first to take
military action would ipso facto be at fault thereby, with all the world coming in
to punish the launcher of violence.10
But an important theme of the later United Nations, as envisaged by the more
“realist” Franklin Roosevelt in 1945, was that some kinds of advance threats are
so ominous that one cannot wait for an actual military attack, that one may in-
stead have to anticipate and preempt such a threat.11 The chain of relevant exam-
ples here is interestingly interlocked. Facing the threat that Adolf Hitler might
have meant to invade the Soviet
Union, as he had outlined in Mein
Kampf, Joseph Stalin confronted
his weaker neighbors in the Baltic
region and demanded that they
submit to a sort of Soviet military
occupation. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia submitted reluctantly, but the Finns
did not. In his dialogues with the Finns before launching an invasion against
them in the winter of 1939, Stalin’s message was a very straightforward exercise
in what we today would call “realism.” He simply accused Finland of being too
small and too weak, so small and weak that it amounted ipso facto to a threat to
Soviet security, if only because it was a power vacuum through which bigger and
more hostile powers could strike at Leningrad and the rest of the USSR.12
Because Finland had been a democratically governed and civilized society be-
tween the wars, Americans and many other people saw this attack as nothing
more than another barbaric and aggressive dictator having his way with a demo-
cratic neighbor, exactly as Hitler had treated Czechoslovakia. At the behest of
many of the Latin American members of the League of Nations, after the mili-
tary invasion of Finland was launched the League actually expelled the USSR
from membership.13 Many ordinary people in France and Britain had the same
moral view of the Russo-Finnish conflict, but Winston Churchill and a number
of the French leaders saw additional strategic advantages to offering some “assis-
tance” to the Finns. Because the logical line of communication for any British
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Whatever the wisdom or folly of the particular
American “preemptive” attack on Iraq, future
American presidents will have to be willing to
consider striking first.
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and French forces coming to help the Finns would run across northern Norway
and Sweden, Churchill saw an opportunity to use the plight of the Finns as an ex-
cuse to cut off Nazi Germany from Swedish iron ore. Further, because Finland
was the victim of what Stalin was styling a preemptive attack, the Allies might
have a way to weaken Nazi Germany economically.14
When asked to give the Allies permission to cross their territory, however,
Sweden and Norway, however sympathetic they themselves were to Finland, re-
fused, knowing that Germany would almost surely invade southern Scandinavia
if such permission were given. Nonetheless, the Allied proposal to “help” the
Finns, much as it was really directed against Nazi Germany’s iron ore sources,
may indeed have helped bring an end to the Winter War between Finland and
the USSR: Stalin, fearing the consequences of being drawn into actual military
combat with even token British and French contingents, somewhat reduced the
demands he was making of the Finns. The Finnish government, seeing what the
Allies were up to and not wanting its Scandinavian friends drawn needlessly into
World War II, softened its attitude on a truce with the Soviets.
But the suspension of warfare between Finland and the USSR in March 1940
did not end the plans of Churchill and his French partners to strike a strategic
blow against Hitler. The troops that had been assembled to land at Narvik and
then to move across northern Norway and Sweden were kept ready for action, as
Churchill also contemplated mining the Norwegian coastal waters through
which Swedish iron ore was shipped from Narvik to Germany. The Nazi German
leadership was hardly unaware of the Allied intention, and Hitler gave orders for
the planning of a preemptive counteroperation. The British mined Norwegian
waters on 8 April 1940, and German armed forces moved into Norway and Den-
mark on the 9th.
To summarize the chain of preemptive logic here, the British and French were
thus not preempting Nazi aggression in Scandinavia in 1940. But they were using
the Soviet self-described preemptive attack on Finland to plan an invasion of
Norway and Sweden. The German attack on Denmark and Norway preempted
this Allied military violation of Norway and Sweden. In the interactions of pre-
emptive motives here, Sweden came out ahead, being allowed to remain neutral,
while Denmark was a loser.
Following the German occupation of Denmark, the British government
elected to act preemptively against the possibility of a similar German move into
Iceland, which had been very loosely affiliated with Denmark under the per-
sonal rule of the Danish monarch. Just as Sweden and Norway had objected to
British military occupation, and as Norway and Denmark had objected to the
German military moves, Iceland protested the British action. When the British
government explained that it had been taken only to head off a German attack,
Q U E S T E R 1 9
C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2007.vp
Thursday, September 13, 2007 3:41:10 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc. du/nwc-review/vol60/iss4/4
the Icelandic government rejected this argument, accepting the occupation only
under protest and with the British promise that the occupation would be termi-
nated as soon as the war with Germany was over.15 When President Roosevelt
elected to join the British occupation of Iceland in 1941, the American govern-
ment asked for an Icelandic invitation, or at least an Icelandic statement that
there was no objection to the American presence. The government in Reykjavík
offered neither, and the United States settled in the end for a statement that the
Icelanders would not violently object, again with a promise that the American
forces would leave when the war with Germany was over.
The end of this trail comes with the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, but the
shadow of preemptive logic does not stop there, for it continued for Finland to
the end of the Cold War. Finland was spared an imposition of communism and
an influx of Slavic immigrants, but was forced to sign a Friendship Treaty pro-
viding that the Soviet Union could demand “urgent consultations” with the
Finnish government whenever Moscow sensed a risk of a new German invasion
coming through Finnish soil.16 It can, indeed, be argued that the United States
and Britain by 1945 sensed a certain legitimacy in Soviet concern for warding off
future invasions through the smaller states to the west. The understanding and
hope of Roosevelt and his advisers, before the Yalta Conference of February 1945
and after, was that the Soviets would be given a preemptive guarantee against
new invasions through Finland and Poland, while these countries would other-
wise be allowed to manage their own affairs. This was indeed what was more or
less achieved for Finland, but it was violated for all the other states that were
forced to live under communist rule.
As the symmetrical opposite of Finland, Iceland in the summer of 1945 natu-
rally enough inquired whether American troops would be leaving, now that the
war in Europe was over.17 The American response was that the war was not
“over” until there was a German peace treaty. The logic of 1939 to 1945 was now
that serious military threats had to be headed off in advance, a very different
logic from the inherent sanctity of small countries proposed by the League of
Nations, and this logic burdened Iceland just as it had burdened Finland. The sub-
sequent history of Icelandic-U.S. relations all through the Cold War shows re-
peated demands for the termination of the American bases in Iceland, amid calls
for Icelandic withdrawal from NATO, fortuitously headed off again and again by
the timing of Soviet military actions in Korea, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.18
To repeat, the League of Nations had regarded preemptive thinking as a major
part of the problem of preserving the peace. The United Nations was to be based
somewhat more on a premise that systems like fascism were inherent threats to
peace, threats that had to be anticipated and preempted. One could see this view
as simply an acceptance of hard-headed “realist” thinking by Roosevelt and
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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everyone else, having seen how rapidly the Nazis had moved from seeming dis-
armament to control of all Western and Central Europe. Much of the dimin-
ished support for collective security and of the renewed legitimacy for
anticipatory self-defense must thus be directed to the experience with Hitler and
his allies. The difference in basic reasoning between the two international orga-
nizations is illustrated by some of the subtle differences between the League of
Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. In articles 53 and 107, the
Charter specifically allows any of the World War II Allies to resume warfare,
without Security Council permission, against any of the enemy states of that
war. Also, the Security Council is charged with dealing with “threats to peace,”
where the League of Nations requirement was simply that an attack on one was
an attack on all.
We now often remember condemnations of preventive war and preemption
as grounded in the United Nations Charter, that is, as a post-1945 phenomenon.
The 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq was thus condemned by a
United Nations vote, with even the United States joining in the criticism. If pre-
ventive wars were contemplated to head off the Soviet or Chinese nuclear pro-
grams, such wars apparently never got very serious consideration.19 One thrust
of this article is that memory may distort the historical record here, as the United
Nations at its founding was less resolutely opposed to preemptive reasoning
than had been the League of Nations.
Because mass-destruction attacks on the American homeland may now be-
come all too possible, attacks that cannot easily be stopped with defenses, attacks
that cannot be so readily deterred as in the confrontations of the Cold War, it
may remain necessary for American presidents to claim the prerogative of pre-
emption (even if the wisdom of the particular preemptive attack against Iraq is
in doubt). Just as the world could not tolerate a reappearance of fascism and the
British could not tolerate the threat of a naval invasion, so the world today may
not be able to tolerate the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.
The basic argument of this article is that there has indeed been an extensive his-
tory of preemptive and anticipatory military action, a history from which les-
sons can be drawn, if the United States will now inevitably have to claim this
prerogative. Preemption is often described as condemned by international law,
but this condemnation was not so clear or strong until World War I showed the
world how horrible war could be. Later, if such a condemnation was clear in the
aftermath of World War I, the memories of World War II served somewhat to re-
duce it.
What, then, are some of the lessons of the historical experience? One kind of
lesson is to be extracted from the way the world saw Stalin’s actions after World
War II. Rather than merely ensuring the USSR against aggression, as Yalta
Q U E S T E R 2 1
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conferees were ready to do, Stalin chose, for reasons of ideology or of more se-
vere preemptive concerns, to deny Poland and Romania, etc., what he tolerated
in Finland. Had he allowed Estonia to be independent, albeit hosting Soviet mil-
itary bases, and had he allowed Poland a democratic government, albeit with So-
viet military bases and transit rights to East Germany, much of the Cold War
would have been different, and much of Western hostility to the Soviet system
could have been avoided.
What Finland achieved in maintaining its own political and cultural charac-
ter, even while being “Finlandized,” is what Iceland also achieved in the West—
to escape being culturally swamped. The American threat here was more a matter
of demographics than of ideological zeal; one constantly had to compare the size
of British or American forces that might be needed to prevent a German or So-
viet invasion with the military-age male cohort of the Icelandic population. At
times during World War II the total of British and American servicemen in Ice-
land vastly exceeded the total Icelanders of similar age, implying a risk that a
great many young Icelandic women would pair off with foreigners rather than
with Icelanders. One of the de-
mands most repeated by oppo-
nents of the American presence
after 1945 was that the garrison at
Keflavík be restricted to the base
or given only a limited number of
passes per month into Reykjavík or any other Icelandic town. A parallel demand
was that American military personnel deployed to Iceland all be of European or-
igin. (This demand was indeed accepted well into the 1950s, it being analogous
to the Saudi Arabian demand that no Jewish personnel be deployed at the Amer-
ican air base in Dhahran.)
On a broader cultural front, the Icelandic demand was that American televi-
sion signals not be transmitted at Keflavík in a manner that would seduce Ice-
landers into watching American programming—this at a time when Iceland was
considering having no television at all, or at most a very limited state-run offer-
ing devoted mostly to culture.20 The end solution for this problem saw American
armed forces television shifted to an on-base cable system, with programs no
longer transmitted over the air, where Icelanders would have been able to tune
them in. A solution for the demographic problem came when the U.S. Air Force
deployed more American female personnel to Keflavík, making the percentage
of females assigned to that base the highest in the world. After a great deal of ar-
guing back and forth, in the end the American presence was contained, so that
Icelandic cultural autonomy could survive, but a crucial military base remained
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
The threat the Royal Navy preempted at Co-
penhagen was existential, a threat to the very
safety of Britain itself.
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under American control (so that, most importantly, it could not quickly fall un-
der Soviet control).
Some would see the difference between Eastern Europe’s fate and the fate of
Iceland as illustrating the difference between democracies and totalitarian dictator-
ships in their foreign policies. Lest one conclude that democracies will always be
restrained in how much they change a territory after feeling driven to take pre-
emptive military possession of it, one must note two earlier preemptive moves
by the United States: the occupation of the Philippines and the incorporation of
Hawaii, both in 1898.21 In both cases, an important incentive for the U.S. govern-
ment was the fear that some other power would seize these positions in the Pa-
cific if the United States did not. In the case of the Philippines, such fears
pertained in particular to Japan and to imperial Germany. (Germany, in the
wake of the Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War, had in fact purchased
the Mariana and Caroline islands from Spain, as well as showing an interest in
the Philippines.) In the case of Hawaii, the powers being preempted were Brit-
ain, Japan, and imperial Russia, all of which had dispatched naval vessels to Ha-
waiian waters at one point or another.
Filipino resistance to the American occupation of the islands produced a very
savage guerrilla war, one that some have compared to the war in Iraq. It had,
however, the happy outcome that the guerrilla resistance was in the end sup-
pressed, and Filipinos over the ensuing four decades came to feel generally posi-
tive about Americans.22 An early American commitment to Filipino
independence was helpful here, as was quite enlightened management of the ter-
ritory once peace was established. In 1898 and afterward, very few Americans
saw the Philippines as slated for statehood and full incorporation into the
United States. The island population was simply too large, and seemingly too
alien in culture and traditions, to be assimilated, and the islands were too far
away geographically.
In contrast, one saw no violent resistance to the American incorporation of
Hawaii, and today Hawaii is seen by one and all as just one more state of the
United States, not only a key naval base that had to be kept out of hostile hands.
But it is important to note that in the first territorial legislature elected after
1898 a majority of the seats went to a party that was opposed to American sover-
eignty. If no such sentiment could ever capture a majority in Hawaii today, an
important reason is that the ethnic nature of Hawaii was changed forever by
massive inflows of Caucasian, Japanese, and other immigrants, to the point
where the native Hawaiian population today represents only some 20 percent of
the total.23
To summarize the comparisons rather bluntly, Hawaii thus suffered the fate
that Stalin tried to impose on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Because the ethnic
Q U E S T E R 2 3
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and social change in Hawaii was relatively complete and successful, only a few
people would today voice any objection. Because the Slavic migration into the
Baltic republics was not completed before the USSR collapsed, the resistance to
such a process became a cause célèbre for the Baltic peoples and one more griev-
ance to be noted around the world against Stalin and the Soviet system. Finland
escaped what Estonia experienced. Finland’s fate was more comparable to that
of Iceland, which in turn escaped what had happened to Hawaii. One general
lesson for practitioners of preemption (for these are all examples of such pre-
emption) would be that one must thus either succeed totally at the assimilation
of the territory involved or else be quite scrupulous about respecting the local
political and social status quo.
A second lesson stems more broadly from the uses to which one’s hegemonic
power and exercises in preemption are put. The example of Britain in the cen-
tury before 1914 is quite suggestive. The British were often imperious, arrogant,
and high-handed, and Americans of all stripes retained resentments on this
score into the twentieth century. One can find such resentment, and fear of the
possibility of a British preemptive naval attack, expressed by people as promi-
nent as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge.24
Yet each of these three prominent thinkers on American naval strategy and
foreign policy was to revert to a view by which Britain was seen not as a rival or
enemy but as a role model and partner. An important explanation for this shift
stems from the relatively benign purposes for which Britain had used its naval
power. The British dominance of the seas (for the preservation of which the
British were so ready to strike the first blow) was used to stamp out piracy and the
slave trade and generally to make the seas safe for the free trade of all—purposes,
indeed, altogether parallel to those for which the U.S. Navy is deployed today. If
power is compounded and retained but used for the political and economic bene-
fit of all, the counterinstincts of balance-of-power thinking are not likely to be so
persuasive, and the logic of “bandwagoning” will play a larger role.
Not every American naval planner came around to the same benign interpre-
tation of British naval strength that Mahan and Roosevelt endorsed at the
end. One sees a curious debate during and after World War I between Admiral
William S. Sims, who had served as head of liaison with the British during the
war and now pooh-poohed any possibility of future Anglo-American conflict,
and Admiral William S. Benson, the first officer to hold the title of Chief of Naval
Operations. Benson wrote repeated memoranda to President Woodrow Wilson
arguing that every state that had ever begun matching Britain on the seas—the
Netherlands, Spain, France, and Germany—had wound up fighting a war with
the British and that the United States was next on the list.25
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The combined lesson of Pax Britannica and the tradition of “Copenhagen-
ing” is thus that some Americans, such as Admiral Benson, deeply resented Brit-
ain, while others felt gratitude for and acceptance of how British power had been
used. The same may be inevitable for any parallel American policy of preemp-
tion in the future. The instincts of balance-of-power thinking are simply too
strong to be swept away entirely by gratitude and bandwagoning, but if the
power exercising a hegemony can show that it is solicitous toward the rest of the
system, some of such instincts can be overcome.
A third set of lessons obviously pertains to the possible setting of precedents
for other powers, who might imitate one’s initiations of armed conflict. In the
aftermath of the American incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, one now often
sees concern as to whether they would embolden Israel or India for preemptive
strikes against Iran or Pakistan, or Japan against North Korea, etc.26
One can find an interesting analogy here in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War in 1904, when the Japanese attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur with-
out giving the warning of a prior declaration of war (a pattern that was to be re-
peated, of course, in 1941 at Pearl Harbor). Americans and most of the
European powers were relatively sympathetic to the Japanese, regarding Japan as
the model of how an Asian state could quickly become modernized and western-
ized and seeing Russia as the most backward of the European states. If Japan was
being welcomed into “the club” of Western and modern states, however, most
Europeans nonetheless regarded the manner of the sneak attack on Port Arthur
as a bit improper and unseemly. The new member of the club obviously needed
to read and study the rules a bit more.
This reaction may thus have been common around the European continent
and in the United States, but it hardly was the response of Sir John Fisher. Rather
than apologizing for or lamenting the style of the Japanese attack, Fisher told his
officers that this was exactly the way preemption should be done, striking early
and first, striking without warning.27 (There had, after all, been no prior declara-
tions of war when the Danish fleets were “Copenhagened.”) These were the years
of the beginning of a British-Japanese formal alliance. Since Japanese naval offi-
cers very much admired and wanted to emulate the British navy in these years,
many of them studying the naval craft in Britain or on British ships, it is indeed
inevitable that the Japanese had heard the British public statements about
“Copenhagening” and fully knew to what the phrase referred. In the same way
that Japan learned from the British and sensed that striking first is morally legit-
imate when one’s existence is threatened, might Japan or another friend of the
United States now learn a parallel lesson from more recent ventures into
“preemption”?
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One argument advanced here is that “preemption” and “anticipatory self-
defense” came to draw moral disapproval as a result of World War I. That war
shocked one and all as an exemplar of how horrible war could now be. That war was
very plausibly the result of interlocking anticipations, when adversaries saw ur-
gent necessity to strike first. The impact of World War I is interestingly illus-
trated by the changes in Theodore Roosevelt’s attitudes as the war broke out.
Roosevelt’s first reaction, in letters and some public comments, was to sympa-
thize with the German need to strike through Belgium, since the French might
have done the same thing in reverse.28 Belgium (perhaps like Finland one world
war later) was just too small and weak to defend itself—that is, was too weak to
avoid becoming a power vacuum and a sort of international nuisance. Great
powers like Germany and France would simply have to do what they needed to
do, and small powers would suffer because of all the inevitabilities.
After weeks of reports, however, about how ordinary Belgians were suffering
in the war they had not started, Theodore Roosevelt shifted dramatically away
from such tough-minded realism to condemning the Germans for having im-
posed war on an innocent neutral. Roosevelt was not to be noted for his logical
consistency, and he never came to any total endorsement of collective security or
of Woodrow Wilson’s vision by which all initiation of war was to be condemned,
but neither could he, in face of the horror of a prolonged World War I, stick to a
much more tolerant view of power politics above all.
Roosevelt in his private letters had earlier even suggested that he would have
sympathized with the British had they chosen to launch a preventive
“Copenhagening” attack on the growing German navy, or with the kaiser had
Germany launched a preventive war attack on land against the Russians.29 Very
few statesmen would have voiced such sympathies in the immediate aftermath
of the carnage of World War I. But the evolution of World War II was to bring
back a lot of more “realistic” thinking of such kinds.
Preemption and preventive war thus indeed have a mixed history in terms of
moral acceptance. The strongest condemnation of such war initiation dates
from 1918 and not from 1945. The world’s experiences before 1914 and after
1938 may yet offer lessons on how we all will have to live with and make the best
of such options.
NOTE S
This article presents some preliminary conclu-
sions in what will be a book-length study of his-
torical analogies to the contemporary issues of
preemption and preventive war, the research for
which is supported by a grant from the Smith
Richardson Foundation. The foundation bears
no responsibility for the propositions presented
here, which are solely those of the author.
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